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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The bankruptcy proceeding that is the subject of this 
appeal is one of three matters pending in three jurisdictions.  
We are advised by the parties that the amount ultimately at 
issue is between 8 or 9 billion dollars.  The specific issue 
before us is the interpretation of the police power exception to 
the automatic stay contained in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).  The 
Bankruptcy Court, affirmed by the District Court, held that 
the automatic stay applies to appellants who have interposed  
various arguments in their effort to overturn that holding.  
Those efforts are unsuccessful and we will affirm. 
 
The Trustee of Nortel Networks U.K. Pension Plan 
(―Trustee‖) and the U.K. Board of the Pension Protection 
Fund (―PPF‖) (collectively ―Appellants‖) appeal from the 
District Court order affirming the decision of the Bankruptcy 
Court to enforce the automatic stay against Appellants with 
respect to their participation in U.K. pension proceedings.  
Appellants argue that the U.K. pension proceedings, which 
were initiated by the U.K. Pensions Regulator (―TPR‖ or ―the 
Regulator‖),1 fall within the police power exception to the 
automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), which allows ―a 
governmental unit‖ to bring or continue actions against a 
debtor to prevent or stop violations of law affecting matters of 
public health, safety, or welfare.  The Debtors, including 
                                              
1
  The U.K. Pensions Regulator is ―a regulatory entity 
created by the U.K. Pensions Act 2004 to protect the benefits 
of members of work-based pension schemes.‖  In re Sea 
Containers, Ltd., No. 06-11156 (KJC), 2008 WL 4296562, at 
*2 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 19, 2008); see also U.K. Pensions 
Act, 2004, c. 35, § 1.   
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U.S.-based Nortel Networks, Inc. (―NNI‖) and NN Caribbean 
and Latin American (―NN CALA‖), together with the 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of NNI (―Committee‖) 
(collectively ―Appellees‖) argue that the police power 
exception does not apply because the Trustee and PPF are 
private parties and not ―governmental units‖ as defined in the 
Bankruptcy Code, and the purpose of the U.K. proceedings is 
to address private pecuniary interests rather than a matter of 
public concern.   This appeal requires us to decide whether 
the police power exception under § 362(b)(4) applies to 
Appellants‘ participation in the U.K. proceedings.    
 
I. 
 
Background 
 
 The Nortel Group (―Nortel Group‖ or ―Nortel‖), 
founded in 1895 as Bell Telephone Company of Canada, was 
a global supplier of telecommunications and computer 
networking solutions.  Nortel‘s global revenue for the 2007 
calendar year was approximately $11 billion, of which 25% 
was generated by the Europe, Middle East and Africa 
(―EMEA‖) region.  As of 2009, the Nortel Group employed 
approximately 24,000 people worldwide.  However, due to 
changes in the industry, Nortel‘s rising pension obligations, 
and the general downturn in the global economy, Nortel 
―faced a deterioration of cash and liquidity‖ and ―concluded 
that a comprehensive financial and business restructuring 
could be most effectively and quickly achieved within the 
framework of creditor protection proceedings in multiple 
jurisdictions.‖  J.A. at 329. 
 
In early 2009, the Debtors filed voluntary petitions for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware and the 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors was then formed.  
Concurrently, Nortel Networks Corporation (―NNC‖)—
Nortel Group‘s ultimate holding company listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange—and other Canadian affiliates 
entered insolvency proceedings in Canada.  In addition, the 
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High Court of Justice in England placed Nortel Networks 
U.K. Limited (―NNUK‖) and other European Nortel entities 
into administration.
2
  The Bankruptcy Court recognized the 
Canadian and U.K. proceedings as ―foreign main‖ 
proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
triggered the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1502(4), 1517(b)(1), 1520(a)(1).   
 
Later, in June 2009, Nortel entities from the United 
States, Canada and the EMEA region entered into the Interim 
Funding and Settlement Agreement (―IFSA‖), which was 
approved by the Bankruptcy Court.  The IFSA provides for 
the parties‘ cooperation in the global sales of Nortel‘s 
business units and agreement that the proceeds of any sale 
will be held in escrow until the parties either reach a 
consensual allocation or obtain a binding procedure for the 
allocation pursuant to an agreed upon protocol.   
 
In an opinion entered February 17, 2011, the Canadian 
trial court noted that ―Nortel has sold substantially all of its 
operating businesses in the course of insolvency proceedings 
in Canada, England and the United States,‖ and ―[t]he 
proceeds are being held in escrow pending determination of 
how they are to be allocated among the various Nortel 
Companies.‖  In re Nortel Networks Corp., 2011 CarswellOnt 
1074, ¶ (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).  At oral argument 
before us, the parties explained that the proceeds, which total 
upwards of $8 billion, are being held in escrow in New York 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in Canada and the 
United States.  
 
In September 2009, the Trustee and PPF timely filed 
joint claims against the U.S. Nortel entities in the Bankruptcy 
                                              
2
 Under U.K. law, the court appoints a person (―the 
administrator‖) to manage ―the affairs, business and property 
of the company‖ during the period that the company is in 
administration.  One of the purposes of an administration 
order may be ―the survival of the company . . . as a going 
concern[.]‖  Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 8(2)-(3) (U.K.). 
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Court.  Those claims allege that the NNUK pension plan is 
underfunded by an estimated $3.1 billion (or £2.1 billion), 
and that TPR may seek to require certain of the U.S. Debtors, 
including NNI and NN CALA, to provide financial support 
for the NNUK plan under the U.K. Pensions Act 2004.  
Appellants‘ claims in the U.S. bankruptcy proceedings were 
filed as contingent and unliquidated because they are 
predicated on the outcome of the U.K. proceedings.  As 
counsel for the U.S. Debtors stated, Appellants‘ claims are 
―among the largest, if not the largest, claims filed in [the U.S. 
bankruptcy proceedings].‖  J.A. at 615-16.   
 
The U.K. regulatory proceedings are to determine the 
extent of the liability of NNUK affiliates for the deficit 
because NNUK‘s pension plan is a defined benefit pension 
scheme established under and governed by U.K. law.  As 
explained by the U.S. Debtor‘s expert Richard Hitchcock, in 
defined benefit plans, ―it is not until a member comes to retire 
that the true extent of his or her pension entitlement [based in 
this case on final salary] can be known[.  Thus,] funding on 
an ongoing basis is always a matter of estimation.‖  J.A. at 
71.  In February 2010, NNUK‘s plan had over 40,000 
members including those not yet in retirement.   
 
With respect to Appellants‘ roles in the U.K. 
proceedings under U.K. law, the PPF is a government-created 
but privately funded entity that provides payments to 
members of defined benefit pension plans whose employers 
cannot fully fund their pension obligations.  In other words, 
the PPF acts as a ―safety net.‖  J.A. at 72-73, 400.   
 
Appellants‘ expert Richard Favier stated that after 
receiving notice that NNUK was placed into administration, 
PPF entered an ―assessment period‖ during which PPF 
―assess[es] whether it is required under the relevant statutory 
provisions to take responsibility to pay members‘ benefits,‖ 
and ―tr[ies] to ensure that the scheme recovers all debts due to 
it.‖  J.A. at 402.  The U.S. Debtor‘s expert Hitchcock 
explained that the Trustee is a private party responsible for 
administering the plan and ensuring that members receive 
 7 
 
their benefits.  It ―retain[s] responsibility for paying benefits, 
during the assessment period.‖  J.A. at 73.  However, its 
―rights and powers . . . in relation to any debt . . . due to [it] 
by the employer. . . are exercisable by the Board [of the PPF] 
to the exclusion of the trustees or managers.‖  U.K. Pensions 
Act, 2004, c. 35, § 137(2).  PPF is still in an assessment 
period with respect to NNUK‘s plan and has not yet stepped 
in to pay benefits to NNUK plan members.   
 
TPR was established under the U.K. Pensions Act 
2004 as the U.K. governmental agency charged with 
regulating occupational pension schemes in the U.K., such as 
NNUK‘s plan.  The objectives of TPR as originally stated 
under the Act are: ―(a) to protect the benefits under 
occupational pension schemes of, or in respect of, members 
of such schemes, (b) to protect the benefits under personal 
pension schemes of, or in respect of, members of such 
schemes . . ., (c) to reduce the risk of situations arising which 
may lead to compensation being payable from the Pension 
Protection Fund . . ., and (d) to promote, and to improve 
understanding of, the good administration of work-based 
pension schemes.‖3  U.K. Pensions Act, 2004, c. 35, § 5(1).  
TPR is not a party to the instant lawsuit and has not sought to 
intervene.
4
 
 
The UK Pensions Act provides that to meet its 
objectives, TPR ―may determine whether or not to take 
regulatory action, which includes, inter alia, determining 
whether the applicable pension is underfunded, quantifying 
the deficit and holding the employer or a related party 
responsible for such deficit.‖  In re Nortel Networks Corp., 
                                              
3
 The U.K. Pensions Act of 2008 added to TPR‘s stated 
objectives by inserting ―(ca) to maximise compliance with the 
duties under Chapter 1 of Part 1 (and the safeguards in 
sections 50 and 54) of the Pensions Act 2008….‖  U.K. 
Pensions Act, 2008, c. 30, § 65. 
 
4
 TPR is a party to the proceedings in Canada. 
 
 8 
 
2010 CarswellOnt 1597, ¶ 7 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL) 
(citing U.K. Pensions Act, 2004, c. 35, § 96).  The 
Determinations Panel (―DP‖) is an internal group of TPR that 
―determines whether the regulatory functions should be 
exercised.‖  Id.  In this case, TPR concluded that NNUK was 
―insufficiently resourced‖ on June 30, 2008.5  Thus, grounds 
existed for TPR to institute administrative proceedings under 
the U.K. Pensions Act 2004 to recover the underfunding from 
NNUK and its affiliates.   
 
Thereafter, in August and September 2009, TPR 
advised NNUK and other Nortel entities that it was 
considering issuing a warning notice, which is a mandatory 
step towards issuing a Financial Support Direction (―FSD‖).  
A warning notice sets out the grounds for the potential 
issuance of an FSD, which is a direction requiring the target 
entity to put financial support in place for an underfunded 
pension scheme.   See U.K. Pensions Act, 2004, c. 35, § 
43(3).  Any company that is an associate of or is otherwise 
connected with a U.K. pension fund employer may be issued 
an FSD.  See U.K. Pensions Act, 2004, c. 35, § 43(6).              
 
In January 2010, TPR issued a warning notice to NNC, 
NNI, NN CALA, and twenty-six other companies in the 
Nortel Group.  The notice informed the target companies that 
they had until March 1, 2010 to make submissions to TPR 
under the U.K. Pensions Act.  Under the U.K. Pensions Act, 
the decision to issue an FSD must occur within two years 
after the ―relevant time‖ commences.  In this case, TPR has 
determined that the time commenced when it determined that 
the fund was insufficiently resourced on June 30, 2008, such 
that the decision to issue an FSD had to be made by June 30, 
2010.   
 
On February 18, 2010, the U.S. Debtors filed a Motion 
for Entry of an Order Enforcing the Automatic Stay Against 
                                              
5
 The U.S. Debtors did not file their Chapter 11 petition 
until January 14, 2009.  (Bankr. Ct. Dist. Del., Case No. 09-
10138-KG, ECF No. 1). 
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Certain Claimants With Respect to the U.K. Pension 
Proceedings pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and (a)(6).  
Essentially, the Debtors asked the Bankruptcy Court to 
enforce the automatic stay to prevent Appellants from 
participating in the U.K. proceedings with respect to U.S. 
Debtors‘ liability for NNUK‘s plan deficit.   
On February 26, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which the 
parties presented testimony from expert witnesses and made 
arguments.  The Debtors submitted the expert testimony of 
Richard Hitchcock, an English pension lawyer describing the 
relevant statutory regime, the powers of TPR, and who 
benefits from TPR‘s exercise of its power, as well as John 
Ray, the Principal Officer to Debtors appointed by the 
Bankruptcy Court, opining that enforcement of the stay is 
needed because the allocation issue to be determined in the 
U.K. proceedings overlaps with the issue before the 
Bankruptcy Court.  Appellants submitted expert testimony of 
David Wyndham Davies, Chairman of the Board of NNUK 
Pension Trust, opining that the Determinations Panel is the 
best forum for resolving U.K. regulatory procedure, Richard 
Favier, Senior Insolvency Advisor to PPF, describing the role 
of PPF and importance of Appellants‘ participation in the 
U.K. proceedings, and Robert Wallace Ham, an English 
pension lawyer, explaining the law and practice related to 
FSDs.  
 
After the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court issued an 
Order Enforcing the Automatic Stay Against Certain 
Claimants with Respect to the U.K. Pensions Proceedings 
prohibiting Appellants from participating in the U.K. 
proceedings as to U.S. Debtors NNI and NN CALA.  The 
automatic stay order provides: ―The automatic stay imposed 
by Section 362 . . . is hereby enforced as to the . . . Trustee 
and the PPF and is fully applicable to the U.K. Pension 
Proceedings with respect to the Debtors . . . and with respect 
to the Debtors such Proceedings are deemed void and of no 
force or effect; to the extent that either . . . the . . . Trustee or 
the PPF participate in the U.K. Pension Proceedings as to any 
Debtors, such participation will be in violation of the 
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automatic stay and subject . . . to sanctions under Section 
362.‖  J.A. at 30.   
 
On March 9, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court issued a 
written memorandum opinion setting forth its reasoning for 
the stay order.  See In re Nortel Networks Corp., 426 B.R. 84 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2010).  The Court concluded that the police 
power exception to the automatic stay does not apply because 
(1) neither the Trustee nor PPF is a ―governmental unit‖ as 
defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(27); and (2) narrowly construing 
the police power exception, the U.K. proceedings do not pass 
the public policy or pecuniary purpose tests because ―the 
focus of the U.K. Proceedings is to procure a pecuniary 
benefit[ ] for a private party — the Trustee. . . . [U]nder the 
U.K. Pensions Act . . . if necessary, the TPR will attempt to 
impose and liquidate an enforceable debt, to be enforced by 
or on behalf of the Trustee, for an amount to be paid to the 
Trustee.‖  J.A. at 48.  Having decided the issue before it, the 
Court then opined on prejudice:  ―The question of whether 
and to what extent affiliates of NNUK should be responsible 
for NNUK‘s obligations is part and parcel of the entire cross-
affiliate benefit and contribution issue and the allocation 
process.  . . . [T]hese issues . . . should not be decided, even in 
part, by an administrative body [referring to TPR] in a single 
jurisdiction with a single constituency.‖  J.A. at 52.    
 
Similar to the U.S. Debtors, the court-appointed 
monitor for the Canadian debtors filed a motion in Canada 
seeking a stay of the U.K. proceedings.  On the same day the 
Bankruptcy Court issued its stay order in the instant case, the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the monitor‘s 
motion and held that ―for the purposes of the [Canadian 
insolvency] proceedings, the actions taken by The [U.K.] 
Pensions Regulator, are null and void in Canada and are to be 
given no force or effect.‖  J.A. at 780; see also In re Nortel 
Networks Corp., 2010 CarswellOnt 1597, ¶ 1(d) (Can. Ont. 
Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).  TPR appeared in the Canadian 
proceedings and pursued relief from the stay, but it has not 
participated in the U.S. proceedings. 
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The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed TPR‘s 
appeal of the stay order on the merits and held that ―the 
service of the Warning Notice [by TPR] breached the stay 
provisions in the [Superior Court‘s] Initial Order.  The service 
of the Notice is, therefore, a nullity for purposes of the 
[Canadian insolvency] proceedings.‖   In re Nortel Networks 
Corp., 2010 CarswellOnt 4112, ¶ 1(Can. Ont. C.A.) (per 
curiam) (WL).  The Supreme Court of Canada summarily 
denied appeal.  See U.K. Pensions Regulator v. Nortel 
Networks Corp. et al., 2011 CarswellOnt 303 (S.C.C.) (per 
curiam) (WL).  Appellants, who are also parties to the 
litigation in Canada, subsequently moved to lift the stay in 
Canada to permit them to participate in the U.K. proceedings 
with respect to the Canadian debtors.  At oral argument 
before this court, the parties stated that Justice Winkler (the 
Ontario Chief Justice) will oversee mediation proceedings 
beginning in November, which will focus on the allocation of 
Nortel‘s assets.  We consider that statement and forthcoming 
proceeding of extreme significance. 
 
While the appeal of the Bankruptcy Court‘s stay order 
was pending before the District Court, the Determinations 
Panel held a hearing in the U.K. to decide whether to issue an 
FSD.  NNI and NN CALA forfeited their statutory rights to 
participate and instead complied with the stay order.  
According to TPR, the Trustee participated in the proceedings 
by providing witness statements, expert reports and 
documentary evidence, but only with respect to TPR‘s request 
for an FSD against Nortel entities that are not subject to the 
stay order.  See Reasons of the Determinations Panel of the 
Pensions Regulator, Case Ref. TM6409, ¶¶ 6, 14 (Jun. 25, 
2010), available at 
www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/DN1709618.pdf 
[hereinafter cited as ―Reasons of the Determinations Panel‖].   
 
On June 25, 2010, TPR issued a determination notice 
directing that FSDs be issued against twenty-five Nortel 
entities after periods for appeal lapsed.  See Determinations 
Panel, Determination Notice, Case Ref. TM6409 (Jun. 25, 
2010), available at 
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http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/DN1694856.pd
f.  In its separately filed statement of reasons, the DP stated 
that even though the Canadian and American Nortel entities 
did not participate, ―much of the evidence and representations 
which have been submitted to [TPR] are based on the 
Group‘s own documentation in submissions to the regulatory 
or tax authorities or on documentation submitted by 
representatives for the individual companies to the UK or 
North American courts in insolvency proceedings.‖  Reasons 
of the Determinations Panel at ¶ 19.  The Determinations 
Panel concluded that it was reasonable to issue FSDs against 
NNUK‘s affiliates because the Nortel Group operated as a 
―single global entity,‖ and the U.S. entities ―benefited 
indirectly . . . as a result of [the] failure adequately to repair 
the Scheme‘s deficit.‖  Id. at ¶¶ 91, 108.  
 
After briefing in the U.S. District Court, the Magistrate 
Judge issued a report and recommendation (―R&R‖), 
recommending that the automatic stay order be affirmed in all 
respects because ―(1) the police power exception is to be 
narrowly construed; (2) the [U.K.] Proceedings do not pass 
the pecuniary purpose or public policy test which would 
exempt them from the stay; and (3) the Bankruptcy Court did 
not impermissibly base its decision on the issue of prejudice.‖  
J.A. at 18.  Appellants filed objections, arguing that the 
Magistrate Judge erroneously applied an abuse of discretion 
standard of review, read the statute too narrowly, incorrectly 
determined the exception did not apply, and incorrectly 
concluded that the Bankruptcy Court did not err by discussing 
prejudice.   
 
On March 29, 2011, the District Court issued an order 
adopting the R&R and affirming the Bankruptcy Court‘s 
automatic stay order.  The Court stated: ―Reviewing the 
R&R, de novo, with respect to the objections lodged, the 
Court concludes that [the Magistrate] Judge . . . did not err in 
her conclusions with respect to the Bankruptcy Court‘s 
findings of fact and its legal determinations.‖  J.A. at 8-9.       
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The Trustee and PPF timely appealed.  Appellants 
filed a motion to expedite their appeal, and this court granted 
the motion in a summary order.   
 
On April 1, 2011, the DP issued FSDs against several 
Nortel entities including NNI and NN CALA.  Thus, under 
U.K. law, the Nortel entities had six months—until October 1, 
2011—to secure financial support for NNUK‘s plan.  That 
time has passed and, inasmuch as it appears the Nortel entities 
failed to appear and to secure financial support for NNUK‘s 
plan, the DP has the authority to issue a Contribution Notice 
(―CN‖) against them.  A CN ―state[es] that the [entity] is 
under a liability to pay to the trustees . . . the sum specified in 
the notice,‖ which can be either all or some of the plan 
deficit.  J.A. at 99, 101.  Under U.K. law, ―[t]he sum specified 
in the [contribution] notice is to be treated as a debt due from 
the [entity] to the trustees or managers of the scheme.‖  U.K. 
Pensions Act, 2004, c. 35, § 49(3).  That law provides that the 
DP should issue such a notice only if it is reasonable to do so 
and upon consideration of several criteria set forth in the 
Pensions Act, which are similar to those considered in 
connection with issuance of an FSD.  Despite this similarity, 
the Appellees emphasize that a CN cannot be issued until the 
TPR determines the financial situation of the relevant entities. 
See U.K. Pensions Act, 2008, c. 35, § 38(7).   
 
Appellants nevertheless insist that they are not 
attempting to enforce collection of debt outside of the U.S. 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Instead, they assert that the FSD 
process will help quantify the liability of NNUK affiliates 
under the U.K. Pensions Act for the benefit of the Bankruptcy 
Court.  Indeed, after receiving word of the U.S. Debtors‘ 
motion to enforce the automatic stay, TPR wrote a letter to 
the Debtors‘ U.K. counsel stating: ―It is crucial to note that an 
FSD is not a claim against assets of a party, and the 
Regulator
6
 is not engaged in a process of enforcement or of 
seeking priority for claims lodged in the Chapter 11 
proceedings.  An FSD may result in the agreement of a party 
                                              
6
  See supra note 1. 
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to offer financial support, or the issue by the DP of a 
contribution notice . . . which is treated as a debt due . . . .‖  
J.A. at 394.  The letter continued: ―It is not a process that 
targets assets but will allow the debt due to the Trustees of the 
NNUK pension scheme from parties such as the Debtors to be 
ascertained and quantified.‖  J.A. at 396 (emphasis in 
original). 
 
Appellees counter that they believe Appellants will use 
the FSD and CN to their advantage and seize assets, which 
will put Appellants in a better position than other creditors.  
As the Bankruptcy Court stated, ―[w]hat we have here are 
creditors who have filed claims in this Court and who are 
seeking to litigate those claims clear of the Court‘s 
jurisdiction and the automatic stay.  Their effort to do so is 
inimical to the Debtors‘ effort and those of non-U.S. debtors 
in a highly complex liquidation to assemble the assets, reduce 
them to money, allocate those assets among numerous entities 
in many countries and then distribute the assets.‖  J.A. at 46-
47.  Appellees also point out that the Bankruptcy Court is 
capable of quantifying the liability under U.K. law, as 
required, within the context of the allocation proceedings.  As 
such, Appellees object not only to the collection of assets in 
the U.K. outside of the allocation process but also the 
assessment and quantification of the liability in the U.K. even 
if only used as a guide for the Bankruptcy Court.
7
 
 
II. 
                                              
7
 The Canadian court noted that the majority of Nortel‘s 
creditors are individual unsecured creditors, such as 
employees and former employees with claims for pension and 
medical benefits.  ―For many of these individuals, the delay in 
receiving a meaningful distribution can be significant . . . .  
For this group of creditors, time is not on their side. . . .  
[Whereas,] the timing of a receipt of a distribution may be 
less critical for a financial player . . . .‖  See In re Nortel 
Networks Corp., 2011 CarswellOnt 5740, ¶¶ 12, 14 (Can. 
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).  
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Standard of Review 
 
 This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
158(d)(1).  We exercise plenary review of an order from a 
district court sitting as an appellate court in review of a 
bankruptcy court and we will review both courts‘ legal 
conclusions de novo.
8
  We review a bankruptcy court‘s 
factual findings for clear error.  We engage in a mixed 
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact, and 
apply a clearly erroneous standard to ―integral facts,‖ but 
exercise plenary review of the court‘s interpretation and 
application of those facts to legal precepts.  In re Exide 
Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 961-62 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
―This issue requires us to interpret and apply the legal 
precepts underlying section 362.  Accordingly, the standard 
of review is plenary.‖  Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 
959 F.2d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  To the 
extent that we consider the decisions of the bankruptcy court 
and district court regarding comity, we review for abuse of 
discretion.  Remington Rand Corp.-Del. v. Bus. Sys., Inc., 830 
F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d Cir. 1987).   
 
III. 
                                              
8
 ―Because the District Court sat below as an appellate 
court, this Court conducts the same review of the Bankruptcy 
Court‘s order as did the District Court.‖  In re Telegroup, 
Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
Accordingly, even if we were to accept Appellants‘ argument 
that the Magistrate Judge and District Court ―gave 
unwarranted deference to the Bankruptcy Court‘s erroneous 
conclusions of law,‖ see Appellants‘ Br. at 52, the result of 
this appeal would be the same.  Similarly, we need not 
evaluate Appellants‘ argument that the Bankruptcy Court 
improperly considered prejudice when deciding whether the 
U.K. proceedings fit within the police power exception 
because we have exercised plenary review over this legal 
issue and accordingly have not considered prejudice. 
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Analysis 
 
 When a debtor files for bankruptcy, Section 362(a) of 
the Bankruptcy Code imposes a broad automatic stay.  That 
stay prohibits ―all entities‖ from, inter alia, ―the 
commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, 
administrative, or other action or proceeding against the 
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the 
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement 
of the case under this title.‖  11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (6).  The 
automatic stay provides one of the fundamental protections 
for debtors found in the Bankruptcy Code.  See, e.g., 
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 
494, 503 (1986).   
 
Congress, however, has created certain statutory 
exceptions that prevent the operation of the automatic stay.  
The police power exception at issue in this case allows for 
―the commencement or continuation of an action or 
proceeding by a governmental unit or any organization 
exercising authority . . . to enforce such governmental unit‘s 
or organization‘s police and regulatory power, including the 
enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, 
obtained in an action or proceeding by the governmental unit 
to enforce such governmental unit‘s or organization‘s police 
or regulatory power.‖  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).  ―This 
exception discourages debtors from submitting bankruptcy 
petitions either primarily or solely for the purpose of evading 
impending governmental efforts to invoke the governmental 
police powers to enjoin or deter ongoing debtor conduct 
which would seriously threaten the public safety and welfare 
(e.g., environmental and/or consumer protection 
regulations).‖  In re McMullen, 386 F.3d 320, 324-25 (1st Cir. 
2004) (citing In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 263 B.R. 99, 
107 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (noting that fundamental policy of 
§ 362(b)(4) is to ―prevent[ ] the bankruptcy court from 
becoming a haven for wrongdoers‖) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)); see also United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 
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857 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1988) (―To combat the risk that 
the bankruptcy court would become a sanctuary for 
environmental wrongdoers, among others, Congress enacted 
the police and regulatory power exception to the automatic 
stay.‖).   
 
The parties do not challenge the extraterritorial 
application of the automatic stay to the U.K. proceedings.
9
  
See David P. Stromes, Note, The Extraterritorial Reach of the 
Bankruptcy Code’s Automatic Stay: Theory vs. Practice, 33 
BROOK J. INT‘L. L. 277, 281 (2007) (―Since 1987, United 
States courts have uniformly upheld the extraterritorial 
application of the automatic stay.‖).  In the absence of an 
exception, the plain language of the automatic stay covers 
Appellants‘ participation in the U.K. proceedings because the 
U.K. proceedings are an attempt to ―assess‖ a claim against 
the Debtors that arose pre-petition.
10
 
 
The exception on which Appellants rely for their 
contention that the automatic stay does not preclude their 
participation in the U.K. proceedings is the police power 
exception as set forth in § 362(b)(4).  Application of that 
exception requires us to determine in the first instance 
whether the U.K. proceeding is a ―proceeding by a 
governmental unit‖ and, necessarily, which entity, if any, is 
the relevant ―governmental unit.‖  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).   
 
A.  Governmental Unit 
 
The police power exception to the automatic stay 
applies to ―the commencement or continuation of an action or 
                                              
9
 Appellants‘ Br. 23 n.14; Debtors‘ Br. 24 n.17.  
 
10
 Appellants insist that they are not seeking to ―recover‖ 
anything in the U.K. proceedings.  As they state in their 
Reply Brief, ―each of the Trustee and PPF has expressly 
represented to the Bankruptcy Court that it will make no 
effort to enforce that debt outside the Bankruptcy Court‘s 
claims allowance process.‖  Reply Br. at 24.    
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proceeding‖ taken by a ―governmental unit . . . to enforce 
such governmental unit‘s . . . police and regulatory power.‖  
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).  We must first determine which entity 
is the relevant governmental unit in the U.K proceedings. 
 
As we set forth at the outset, the two Appellants are 
the Trustee and PPF. The Bankruptcy Court held that neither 
Appellant is a governmental unit as defined under the Code.  
Under the Bankruptcy Code, ―[t]he term ‗governmental unit‘ 
means United States; State; Commonwealth; District; 
Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States 
trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a 
State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a 
municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic 
government.‖  11 U.S.C. § 101(27).  The legislative history of 
§ 101(27) instructs that ―‗[d]epartment, agency, or 
instrumentality‘ does not include entities that owe their 
existence to state action such as the granting of a charter or a 
license but that have no other connection with a State or local 
government or the Federal Government.  The relationship 
must be an active one in which the department, agency, or 
instrumentality is actually carrying out some governmental 
function.‖  In re Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977)).    
 
We see no basis to disagree with the Bankruptcy 
Court‘s conclusion that neither the Trustee nor PPF is a 
―governmental unit‖ within the scope of the police power 
exception.  Under U.K. law, the Trustee is a private party 
responsible for administering the plan and ensuring that 
members receive their benefits; the PPF is a government-
created but privately funded entity that acts as a ―safety net‖ 
by providing payments to members of defined benefit pension 
plans whose employers cannot fully fund their pension 
obligations.  J.A. at 72-73, 400.  Even though PPF ―owe[s] its 
existence‖ to the U.K. Pensions Act, the relationship is not 
―active‖ during the assessment period because PPF is 
standing in the shoes of a private party.  Accordingly, neither 
the Trustee nor PPF is a governmental unit during the 
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assessment period for the purposes of the police power 
exception. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court proceeded to analyze the 
applicability of the police power exception using TPR as the 
relevant governmental unit.  In the only case cited by the 
parties that addressed whether the U.K. regulatory procedure 
initiated by TPR violates the automatic stay, a bankruptcy 
court in Delaware also concluded that TPR was the relevant 
governmental unit.  See In re Sea Containers Ltd., No. 06-
11156, 2008 WL 4296562, at *9 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 19, 
2008) (approving a Settlement Agreement).   
 
It is TPR that has been fulfilling its statutory objectives 
―to protect the benefits of members of occupational pension 
schemes‖ and ―to reduce the risk of situations arising 
whereby compensation would become payable by the PPF‖ 
by initiating the U.K. proceedings, which only TPR had the 
authority to do.  See Reasons of the Determinations Panel, 
supra p.13 at ¶ 3.  Therefore, it appears that TPR is a 
governmental unit for the purposes of determining the 
applicability of the police power exception to the U.K. 
proceedings.  However, TPR is not a party to the pending 
bankruptcy proceedings.  Unlike the Trustee and PPF, it did 
not file a claim and therefore cannot assert the police power 
exception.
11
 
                                              
11
 We assume but do not decide that private parties can 
rely on the police power exception to participate in 
proceedings to enforce a governmental unit‘s police and 
regulatory power when the relevant governmental unit is not a 
party to the bankruptcy proceedings.  Cf. In re Aerobox 
Composite Structures, LLC, No. 11-07-10138, 2008 WL 
1733601 (Bankr. D.N.M. Apr. 10, 2008) (holding that an 
individual who had received notice of the filing of debtor‘s 
bankruptcy proceeding was permitted to participate in post-
petition proceedings before the human rights commission of 
the State of New Mexico Department of Labor through the 
operation of the police power exception). 
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B.  Pecuniary Purpose and Public Policy Tests 
 
 There is yet another obstacle to the Appellants‘ 
argument that the proceedings at issue fall within the police 
power exception to the automatic stay.  To make this 
determination, courts have applied  two ―related, and 
somewhat overlapping‖ tests:  the pecuniary purpose test and 
the public policy test.
12
  Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 
1098, 1108 (9th Cir. 2005).  The pecuniary purpose test asks 
whether the government primarily seeks to protect a 
pecuniary governmental interest in the debtor‘s property, as 
opposed to protecting the public safety and health.  The 
public policy test asks whether the government is effectuating 
public policy rather than adjudicating private rights.  If the 
purpose of the law is to promote public safety and welfare or 
to effectuate public policy, then the exception to the 
automatic stay applies.  If, on the other hand, the purpose of 
the law is to protect the government‘s pecuniary interest in 
the debtor‘s property or primarily to adjudicate private rights, 
then the exception is inapplicable.  See, e.g., Chao, 270 F.3d 
at 385.  The complementary tests ―are designed to sort out 
cases in which the government is bringing suit in furtherance 
of either its own or certain private parties‘ interest in 
obtaining a pecuniary advantage over other creditors.‖  Id. at 
389.   
 
                                              
12
 It is unclear whether the government action must meet 
both tests to fall within the police power exception.  Compare 
Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1108 (―A suit comes within the 
exception of § 362(b)(4) if it satisfies either test.‖); Collier on 
Bankruptcy ¶ 362.05[5][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011) (if action satisfies ―either‖ test 
―then the exception applies‖), with Chao v. Hosp. Servs., Inc., 
270 F.3d 374, 389, 394 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding a suit filed by 
the Secretary of Labor passed the pecuniary interest test but 
failed the public policy test, and therefore did not fall within 
the police power exception).  In light of our holding hereafter, 
we need not decide this issue.     
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The issue is not new to this court.  We have held that 
regulatory proceedings related to environmental hazards, 
health and safety violations, and employment discrimination 
all fall within the police power exception to the automatic 
stay.  See, e.g., In re Mystic Tank Lines Corp., 544 F.3d 524 
(3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that state action to recover the 
costs of cleanup of contaminated site fall within police power 
exception); Brock v. Morysville Body Works, Inc., 829 F.2d 
383 (3d Cir. 1987) (petition by Secretary of Labor to enforce 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration citation for 
violations of safety and health standards); E.E.O.C. v. Hall’s 
Motor Transit Co., 789 F.2d 1011, 1014 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(employment discrimination action brought by Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission).  Additionally, this 
court has concluded that under circumstances involving a 
question of federal-state preemption arising in a case 
involving environmental hazards, ―the exception to the 
automatic stay provision contained in subsections 362(b)(4)-
(5) should itself be construed broadly, and no unnatural 
efforts be made to limit its scope.‖  Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1984).  
 
The U.K. proceedings in this case do not relate to 
public health or safety, and the issue of federal state 
preemption is not present here.  Therefore, the reasons for our 
earlier statement in Penn Terra that the police power 
exception to the automatic stay should be construed broadly 
are not applicable here.
13
  
                                              
13
 In fact, the legislative history expressly supports a 
narrow construction of the police power exception.  In Penn 
Terra we quoted the statements of  
 
Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, and 
Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Improvements in the Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
[who] remarked during the debates on the 
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Instead of making a broad generally applicable 
pronouncement as to how the police power exception should 
be interpreted, we must look to the purpose of the proceeding 
at issue.  In Penn Terra, the environmental purpose behind 
the proceedings at issue fell ―squarely within Pennsylvania‘s 
police and regulatory powers.‖  Id. at 274 (―No more obvious 
exercise of the State‘s power to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of the public can be imagined.‖).  Moreover, in that 
case we were focused on the unique concerns involving 
federal-state preemption.
14
  We supported our decision by 
                                                                                                     
Bankruptcy Reform Act that ―This section [§ 
362(b)(4)] is intended to be given a narrow 
construction in order to permit governmental 
units to pursue actions to protect the public 
health and safety and not to apply to actions by 
a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary 
interest in the property of the debtor or property 
of the estate.‖ 
 
Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274 n.6 (quoting 1978 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News at 6444-45 (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6513 (remarks of Sen. 
DeConcini)). 
 
14
 Appellants argue that the concerns relating to federal-
state preemption present in Penn Terra ―apply with equal, if 
not greater, force where a foreign sovereign‘s interests are 
implicated.‖  Appellants‘ Br. at 22.  Principles of comity do 
not require us to construe the police power exception as 
applying more broadly for foreign proceedings than for 
domestic proceedings.  The Bankruptcy Court did not abuse 
its discretion in its consideration of comity while determining 
that the U.K. proceedings fail both the pecuniary purpose test 
and public policy test.  On the other hand, we do not adopt the 
Magistrate Judge‘s assertion that ―the police powers 
exception should be interpreted narrowly with regard to 
foreign entities.‖  J.A. at 19.  The plain language of the 
Bankruptcy Code defining ―governmental unit‖ as including 
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noting the bankruptcy court‘s ability to enjoin State 
proceedings under § 105 should it be necessary to effectuate 
federal bankruptcy policy.  A bankruptcy court cannot easily 
enjoin foreign proceedings under § 105.  Therefore, the 
reasoning from Penn Terra cautions against a broad reading 
of the exception under the circumstances of this case.   
 
Like the environmental purpose in Penn Terra, the 
purposes behind the proceedings in Morysville Body Works 
and Hall’s Motor Transit Co. also fit squarely within the 
goals intended to be covered by the police power exception.  
According to the legislative history, § 362(b)(4) ―excepts 
commencement or continuation of actions and proceedings by 
governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers.  
Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent 
or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, 
consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory 
laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, 
the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic 
stay.‖  S. Rep. No. 95-989 at 49 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838.   
 
By contrast, the U.K. proceedings in this case do not 
fit within this expressed purpose because they are not 
predicated upon any allegation of wrongdoing on the part of 
Nortel.
15
  Although a close question, we therefore agree with 
                                                                                                     
―a foreign state, or other foreign or domestic government,‖ 11 
U.S.C. § 101(27), provides no justification for drawing any 
distinction between a foreign and domestic state in the 
application of the police power exception.  We note that the 
U.K. proceedings have continued without the participation of 
the parties in this case, and Appellants remain free to file a 
motion for relief from the stay for cause. 
 
15
 Allegations of wrongdoing are not a prerequisite to a 
determination that a particular action or proceeding 
effectuates public policy.  Indeed, the absence of wrongdoing 
is not dispositive here.   
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the Bankruptcy Court‘s conclusion that the U.K. proceedings 
fail both the pecuniary purpose test and the public policy test.  
Through these proceedings, TPR is primarily seeking to 
determine the liability for a financial shortfall in a private 
pension plan.  This purpose does not protect the public safety 
and health as those terms have been applied in the context of 
the police power exception.
16
  Appellants argue that the U.K. 
proceedings advance a public policy because they ―encourage 
                                              
16
Appellants argue that the U.K. Proceedings are similar to 
actions taken by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) that have been held to fall within the police power 
exception.  See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV 
Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 87 B.R. 779, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (section 362(b)(4) exception applies to imposition of 
funding liability following restoration of plan by PBGC), 
aff’d, 875 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 
496 U.S. 633 (1990).  Appellants emphasize the similarities 
between the entities established by the U.K. Pensions Act 
2004 and the PBGC.  Without deciding whether certain 
actions of the PBGC fall within the police power exception, 
we note that there are also significant differences between 
these systems.  The U.K. Pension Act 2004 has divided the 
roles that the PBGC takes on in the U.S. system between 
multiple entities such that the TPR, DP, and PPF each have 
distinct roles in the U.K. system, with distinct goals.  In the 
U.K. proceedings here, TPR‘s primary goal is to determine 
whom to hold liable for the deficiency in NNUK‘s pension 
scheme.  Even assuming that the broader goal of protecting 
pension plans in the U.K. protects the public welfare within 
the meaning of the exception, the specific goal of the U.K. 
proceedings here is too far removed from that purpose for 
them to fall within the police power exception.  Notably, even 
the PBGC is subject to the force of the automatic stay under 
some circumstances.  See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 
v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 
2000) (holding that the PBGC‘s claim for missed minimum 
funding contributions was not entitled to a tax priority in the 
bankruptcy context because a lien could not be imposed due 
to operation of automatic stay).   
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the proper funding and administration of pension schemes 
and also serve to deter the ‗moral hazard‘ created when 
employers and their affiliates evade pension obligations and 
pass off the burden of pension liabilities to the PPF.‖  
Appellants‘ Br. at 32.  The passage of the U.K. Pensions Act 
2004 and the system established by the Act clearly reflect 
public policy decisions.  It does not follow, however, that the 
purpose of the particular U.K. proceedings at issue here is to 
protect the public.  Rather, these particular proceedings are 
focused on the pecuniary interests of the PPF and the 
members of NNUK‘s pension scheme.  
 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that TPR is 
primarily adjudicating private rights through these 
proceedings.  Indeed, the U.K. Pensions Act 2004 expressly 
states that the ―main objectives of [TPR] in exercising its 
[regulatory] functions‖ include ―to protect the benefits under 
occupational pension schemes of, or in respect of, members 
of such schemes‖ and ―to reduce the risk of situations arising 
which may lead to compensation being payable from the 
Pension Protection Fund . . . .‖ U.K. Pensions Act, 2004, c. 
35, §5(1).  The English High Court of Justice Chancery 
Division has also recognized that ―[i]n essence, [TPR‘s] 
function is to protect members of occupational and personal 
pension schemes, and to reduce the risk of claims being made 
on the PPF.‖  Indep. Tr. Servs. Ltd. v. Hope & Others, [2009] 
EWHC (Ch) 2810, [10], 2009 WL 3643864 (U.K. Ch. Nov. 
10, 2009).   
 
Because the Appellants have not shown that they fall 
within the police power exception to the automatic stay, we 
affirm the decision of the District Court that affirmed the 
decision of the Bankruptcy Court enforcing the automatic 
stay. 
 
IV. 
 
Additional Comments 
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Although our judgment affirming the decision of the 
District Court and approving that of the Bankruptcy Court is 
dispositive of the appeal before us, we nonetheless consider 
the additional arguments made by the parties in the hope it 
will resolve some of the remaining matters.  The Appellants 
argue that ―the lower courts erroneously concluded that the 
regulatory power exception does not apply to the U.K. 
regulatory procedure,‖ Appellants‘ Reply Br. at 6, and they 
rely on what they characterize as ―principles of international 
comity‖ in support of their argument.  As we discussed 
above, neither the Trustee nor PPF is a ―governmental unit‖ 
within the scope of the police power exception.  The issue of 
the application of the automatic stay with respect to 
proceedings pending in foreign tribunals has been the subject 
of some academic discussion, see, e.g. Stromes, supra page 
19, at 380-83, and we see no need to add to that body of 
writing.  
 
 Appellants challenge the paragraph of the Bankruptcy 
Court‘s order stating that the automatic stay imposed by § 
362 is enforced as to the U.K. Pension Trustee and the PPF 
―and is fully applicable to the U.K. Pension Proceedings‖ and 
―with respect to the Debtors such Proceedings are deemed 
void and of no force or effect; to the extent that either of the 
U.K. Pension Trustee or the PPF participate in the U.K. 
Pension Proceedings as to any Debtors such participation will 
be in violation of the automatic stay and subject the 
participating persons or entities to sanctions under Section 
362.‖  J. A. at 30.  These statements are no more than 
required by the language and scope of the automatic stay.  
Once the Appellants subjected themselves to the jurisdiction 
of the Bankruptcy Courts by filing their claims, they became 
subject to the provisions of the automatic stay.   
 
Of course, there is nothing now before the Bankruptcy 
Court that requires it to determine what effect, if any, it 
should accord to the estimate adopted by TPR quantifying the 
claim emanating from the U.K. regulatory procedure to $3.1 
billion.  We are not even at the stage at which the Bankruptcy 
Court must decide the admissibility of the findings emanating 
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from the U.K. proceedings.  One factor to be considered by 
the Bankruptcy Court if and when there is an attempt to 
introduce those findings into evidence at a hearing is that 
none of the parties before the Bankruptcy Court participated 
in the U.K. proceedings with respect to the U.S. parties.
17
 
 
In summary, the situation before the various courts and 
tribunals is that there are insufficient funds to satisfy the 
claims of all the creditors. We have seen no estimate as to the 
total of the claims filed in the United States and Canadian 
bankruptcies.  The issues of the competing claims will be 
determined in the allocation stage.  
 
We are concerned that the attorneys representing the 
respective sparring parties may be focusing on some of the 
technical differences governing bankruptcy in the various 
jurisdictions without considering that there are real live 
individuals who will ultimately be affected by the decisions 
being made in the courtrooms.  It appears that the largest 
claimants are pension funds in the U.K. and the United States, 
representing pensioners who are undoubtedly dependent, or 
who will become dependent, on their pensions.
18
  They are 
the Pawns in the moves being made by the Knights and the 
Rooks.   
 
Mediation, or continuation of whatever mediation is 
ongoing, by the parties in good faith is needed to resolve the 
differences.  No party will benefit if the parties continue to 
clash over every statement and over every step in the process.  
                                              
17
 We note that the parties agree that the English Appeal 
Court‘s decision issued on October 14, 2011 has no effect on 
the issues before this court.  See Re Nortel GMBH [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1124 (―COA‖) (holding an FSD or CN issued by 
TPR to a company in administration ranks as an expense of 
the administration under English pensions law); see also 
Debtors‘ Resp. at 2; Creditors‘ Resp. at 1; Appellants‘ Resp. 
at 3. 
 
18
 See supra note 7. 
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This will result in wasteful depletion of the available assets 
from which each seeks a portion.  There appears to be one 
constructive solution – the protocol agreed upon by 
appointing Justice Winkler to resolve the allocation issues.  
He apparently has the respect of all parties and we hope 
(although it is not in our power to order) that the parties 
promptly devise a process by which all conflicting claims are 
put in his hands for resolution. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court.  
     
